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We consider a political career concern model where politicians diﬀer in
their information on the states of the world in diﬀerent periods and the out-
come of a policy in diﬀerent periods depends on the same state of the world.
We show that a politician may continue to implement the past policy even
when a policy change would be socially preferable (perverse policy persis-
tence): changing his mind would indeed damage his reputation, and so reduce
his probability of being reelected. Under the standard assumption that once
ousted from oﬃce a politician cannot run again for election, the old politi-
cian is never reelected (incumbency disadvantage). However, when there is a
positive probability that a politician who was ousted from oﬃce in the past
will stand for reelection in the future, reputational concern may induce a new
politician not to continue the policy introduced by another politician even
when this is not socially desirable (perverse policy unpersistence): conﬁrming
a previous decision made by another politician would indeed improve the rep-
utation of a potential rival in the next elections, and so reduce his probability
of being reelected.
When equilibrium exhibits policy persistence by the incumbent politician and
policy unpersistence by the new politician, the voters’ choice between the two
politicians is actually a choice between changing or not changing the policy
introduced in the previous period. Since politicians have policy expertise, vot-
ers believe that the initial policy is more likely to be the optimal one, and so
they reelect the candidate who implemented it, i.e., the incumbent politician
(incumbency advantage).
Keywords: Policy persistence, policy unpersistence, reputation, incumbency
advantage, incumbency disadvantage, bad reputation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, D82
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A widely accepted idea in political economy is that reelection concern, by making
incumbent politicians accountable, provides them with an incentive to maximize
social welfare. Recent literature has shown, however, that reelection concern may
also give rise to ineﬃcient behavior. For instance, Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and
Maskin and Tirole (2004) show that in order to increase their probability of being
reelected, politicians may pander to public opinion.
The literature on electoral accountability has focused its attention on the politi-
cian’s interest in building his own reputation. However, the probability that the
incumbent politician wins the next election may also depend on the other politicians’
reputation. Thus, if the incumbent politician wishes to improve his own reputation,
he also wishes to worsen (or at least not to improve) the reputation of his rivals. In-
deed, nonincumbent politicians continually lambaste current government’s actions.
Moreover, when a new government takes oﬃce, it generally tries to give evidence
that the previous government acted worse than actually perceived by the citizens,
so that if it fails to fulﬁll its electoral promises, it will (at least partially) shift the
blame to the previous government. To support the above claim, it also generally re-
places some of the most signiﬁcant policies introduced by the previous government.
For exactly the opposite reasons, a government that was reelected often persists in
implementing a past policy even when a policy change would be welfare improving.
The purpose of the paper is to show that these observed behaviors may actually
be rational. In particular, we ﬁnd that a politician’s behavior is aﬀected not only
by his past behavior, but also by the past behavior of another politician. We show
that this may also explain why citizens tend to reelect the incumbent politician
with a higher probability than a new candidate.
Two crucial assumptions for our results are that citizens have imperfect infor-
mation about the eﬀects of the diﬀerent policies (policy uncertainty) and that politi-
cians are better informed than citizens. These assumptions are plausible because
citizens are generally claimed to be rationally ignorant (Downs 1957). Furthermore,
in some cases, the quality of a policy may be uncertain for some time after that
policy was chosen. For example, it will take some time before the wisdom of George
W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq is known (Besley 2006).
Recent literature on electoral accountability, such as Coate and Morris (1995),
already considers models where there exists policy uncertainty. The standard model
assumes that in each period a politician has to make a policy choice, voters observe
the incumbent politician’s choice and (eventually) its consequences, and then they
choose whether to reelect the incumbent politician or elect a new one. A quite
standard assumption is also that the optimal policy in each period is independently
drawn at random, so the fact that a policy is optimal today does not aﬀect the proba-
bility that it will be optimal tomorrow. To support this assumption one might argue
that during their political mandates politicians have to make policy decisions that
solve very diﬀerent (often new) problems. However, such an assumption sometimes
2does not seem so reasonable. Consider the decision to introduce a given policy and
the following decision to either remove or continue the same policy. Can these two
decisions be considered as diﬀerent and unrelated? Can we really say that George
W. Bush’s (not taken) decision to bring troops back some weeks after the Iraq’s
attack has nothing to do with the previous decision to send them there? The two
decisions are certainly diﬀerent because, if nothing else, they are made at diﬀerent
times. Indeed, we live in a world that changes continuously, so a decision that is
optimal today could not be so tomorrow. However, even though the world changes,
it generally does not change too fast. As a matter of fact, there exists a certain
persistence of the state of the world. If it was optimal to attack Iraq on March 19,
2003, although possible, it seems very unlikely that the original (at least oﬃcial)
rationale (US presence in Iraq is necessary to ﬁght terrorism) is no longer applicable
some weeks later. Had George W. Bush withdrawn the troops from Iraq, it seems
most likely that US citizens would have thought that Iraq never had been a real
threat to them. George W. Bush’s decision to attack Iraq would then have been
considered a mistake by American voters. This would have damaged his reputation,
and most likely hurt his future chances of being reelected1.
We analyze political decision-making in a context characterized by persistence of
the state of the world, by considering a simple three-period political career concern
model where each policy choice has to be made for two periods, and it is common
knowledge that the optimal policy is the same in both periods (i.e., there is full
persistence of the state of the world2).
Politicians have more accurate information than voters about the expected con-
sequences of a policy choice, but they diﬀer in their ability to select the correct
policy: while a high-quality politician always knows which is the optimal policy, a
low-quality politician only knows it with a time lag. Once a policy is implemented,
uncertainty resolves to all politicians, but not to voters.
We ﬁrstly study a model in which politicians only care about reelection (they
receive utility simply from holding oﬃce). Under the standard simplifying assump-
tion that once ousted from oﬃce a politician cannot run again for election, we show
that equilibrium exhibits a perverse policy persistence in the sense that a politi-
cian who implemented a certain policy in the past has an incentive not to change
his mind in the future even when doing so would be socially optimal. The logic
underlying this result is very simple. Changing his mind worsens the politician’s
reputation, and so hurts his chances of being reelected. Therefore, in equilibrium,
the old politician who holds the oﬃce in period two never removes the ﬁrst-period
policy. This result helps to explain why we often observe a reluctance of politicians
to change their mind. A necessary condition for the existence of a perverse policy
1It is worth noting that it is not important the actual reasons that led Mr. Bush to invade Iraq
(ﬁghting terrorism, Iraq’s petrol, etc.), but that he chose to do so.
2The assumption of full persistence of the state of the world is not crucial for the analysis: all
the results hold even when we assume that there exists partial persistence.
3persistence is that the politician in oﬃce has already made some decision in the
past. By deﬁnition, a new politician has never held oﬃce, so he never made any
decision. As a consequence, if a new politician is elected, he will always maximize
social welfare. Hence, it turns out to be optimal for the society to elect a new
politician. There exists therefore an incumbency disadvantage.
Although the above conclusions would seem quite straightforward, the situation
is in fact more complex. The assumption that politicians voted out of oﬃce cannot
stand for reelection in the future, besides not being realistic, also plays a crucial role
in our model. Indeed, when there exists a positive probability that a politician who
was ousted from oﬃce in the past stands for reelection in the future, a new politician
never maximizes social welfare. Equilibrium exhibits a perverse policy unpersistence
in the sense that a politician does not continue a policy introduced by another
politician even when doing so would be socially optimal. The logic underlying
this result is also very simple. Conﬁrming a previous decision made by another
politician improves the reputation of a potential rival in the next elections, and so
reduce the probability that the incumbent politician will be reelected. Therefore,
in equilibrium, a new politician who holds the oﬃce in the second period always
removes the ﬁrst-period policy.
Thanks to the commitment power generated by reputation, the incumbent politi-
cian’s behavior may be taken by the voters as an indicator of the candidates’ future
behavior. If we allow for the possibility that a politician voted out of oﬃce can
stand for reelection in the future, the incumbent politician will always continue the
ﬁrst-period policy, while a new politician will always remove it. Thus the voting
decision can be thought as a policy choice: by choosing the candidate who will
hold the oﬃce in the next period, the voters actually choose whether to remove or
continue the policy introduced in the previous period. Since politicians have policy
expertise, voters believe that the ﬁrst-period policy is more likely to be the opti-
mal one, so they reelect the candidate who implemented it, namely the incumbent
politician. An incumbency advantage thus arises.
In the light of the above result, we now can try to explain George W. Bush’s
reelection at the US election of November 2004. At that time, a general and per-
vasive idea was that the presidential election was a referendum on the Iraq war.
Indeed, war on terrorism and the 2003 invasion of Iraq were the dominant themes
throughout the election campaign. George W. Bush won over John Kerry because
the majority of Americans supported the war. Our simple model shows that such
an explanation may make sense. Reputational concern ensures that the electoral
promises made by George W. Bush (staying in Iraq) and John Kerry (leaving Iraq)
were actually believable.
In our model, an incumbency advantage arises because voters endogenously be-
lieve that continuing the previous policy is better than removing it (the former was
indeed selected by an expert politician). This occurs because citizens are aware of
4being poorly informed about the best policy3.
Finally, we study a model where politicians care not only about reelection, but
also about acting in the public interest (they receive a positive utility simply from
maximizing social welfare). In this more general setting, all the previous results
hold. However, now the equilibrium exhibits policy unpersistence of the new politi-
cian only if it is suﬃciently likely that the politician who held the oﬃce in the
previous period will run for reelection in the next period. Therefore, incumbency
may be either advantageous or disadvantageous depending on the probability that
this event will occur.
After a brief review of some related theoretical literature, the remainder of the
paper is organized as follows. In section three, we describe the model. In section
four, we characterize the equilibria of the model where politicians are assumed
to only care about their reelection chances. In section ﬁv e ,w ec h a r a c t e r i z et h e
equilibria of the (more general) model where politicians also care about maximizing
social welfare. Section six provides a discussion of some assumptions of the model
and of possible extensions. Section seven concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper should be contrasted with the works on electoral accountability in which
voters are assumed to have imperfect information about both the eﬀects of policies
(policy uncertainty) and some intrinsic features of a politician like competence or
congruence. The novelty of this paper is the introduction of a persistence of the
state of the world4, which can give rise inter alia to the existence of a perverse
policy persistence. This is in line with the general result of this kind of literature,
i.e., that reputational concern may give rise to an undisciplining eﬀect of reelection.
Coate and Morris (1995) analyze the diﬀerent forms of transfers in a model in
which voters have imperfect information about both the eﬀects of policies and the
motivation of politicians, and show that politicians who are interested in making
transfers to special interests may use ineﬃcient but reputation-preserving methods
of redistribution. Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) consider a political career concern
3Of course, voters may prefer to continue the previous policy for other reasons. For instance,
when a policy is introduced, agents will often respond by undertaking actions in order to beneﬁt
from it, so these actions increase their willingness to retain the policy in the future (Coate and
Morris 1999). Furthermore, incumbency advantage might represent the citizens’ natural answer to
their need of implementing long-term policies. By ensuring continuity of the government’s action,
citizens make sure that some valuable long-term projects and reforms are implemented.
4In fact, this assumption is already made in Schultz (2008). However, in his model there is no
asymmetric information on the politicians’ type, so politicians do not have any incentive to build a
reputation, and our results cannot arise. In Schultz’ model, there is policy uncertainty, politicians
are better informed than voters, but are motivated by ideology. He shows that reelection incentives
can lead to policy-distortion as the government seeks to manipulate (swing) voters’ beliefs to make
its ideology more popular.
5model in which, as in our model, politicians have a policy expertise whose value
depends on the politician’s talent, which is also private information. They show
that reelection concern may induce a politician to pander to public opinion, i.e.,
a politician may choose an action only because it is popular. Maskin and Tirole
(2004) also show that politicians may pander to public opinion. However, they
consider a model where a public oﬃcial attempts to signal congruence rather than
talent, and accountability is not taken as given. Our results have nothing to do
with pandering.
The idea that a politician may act against the public interest in order not to
worsen his reputation is therefore not new. What is new is the fact that a politician
may also act against the public interest in order not to improve the reputation
of another politician (perverse policy unpersistence). This is a general result: in a
model in which a plurality of agents compete with each other to gain the opportunity
of interacting with a principal, reputational concern may induce the incumbent
agent to act against the principal’s interest in order not to improve the reputation
of a potential rival, which could hurt his chances of continuing in the existing
relationship.
This paper can also be related to the game-theoretical literature on bad repu-
tation. In a recent contribution, Ely and Välimäki (2003) show that the possibility
of building a reputation can hurt a long-run agent who interacts with a sequence of
short-run players. This ﬁnding is a counterpoint to a pervasive idea arising from the
traditional literature on reputation eﬀects pioneered by Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) that reputation is good for the long-run player.
The bad reputation result also arises in our model. Reelection concern may induce
a politician to act against the public interest, so voters may respond by not selecting
him to hold oﬃce in the future.
This paper should also be contrasted with Coate and Morris (1999)’s theory of
why policies might persist. The key point of their theory is that the introduction
of a policy alters the incentives in the political process in favor of the new status
quo. They consider one particular mechanism by which this occurs: “When a
policy is introduced, agents will often respond by undertaking actions in order to
beneﬁt from it. These actions increase their willingness to pay for the policy in the
future. This extra willingness to pay will be translated into political pressure to
retain the policy and this means it is more likely to be operative in the future” (p.
1327). In their model, politicians are all identical, so voters vote retrospectively
and reputation does not play any role. By contrast, in our model, voters vote
prospectively and the phenomenon of persistence is due to reputational concern. An
immediate implication of our ﬁndings is that the probability that a policy persists
depends on the politician who holds the oﬃce (who is either the politician who
introduced that policy or a new politician). This could be an interesting statement
to be tested empirically.
Finally, this paper is related to the incumbency advantage literature. That
6literature suggests several reasons why holding oﬃce could be an advantage. The
standard idea is that incumbents use policies and resources to increase their chances
of being reelected: incumbents may provide electorally valuable constituency ser-
vices (see, e.g., Fiorina 1977), pork-barrel politics, and so forth. In our model, the
existence of an incumbency advantage does not need any ‘opportunistic’ behavior
from the politician who holds the oﬃce. Another explanation of an incumbency
advantage is that incumbents have a higher quality than challengers. Electoral
selection (see, e.g., Banks and Sundaram 1998 and Zaller 1998) and challenger de-
terrence (see, e.g., Cox and Katz 1996 and Gordon et al. 2007) are two possible
reasons for this discrepancy. In our model, the incumbency advantage is due to
ad i ﬀerence on the candidates’ future behavior rather than to a diﬀerence in their
quality. Although there may be many reasons for an incumbency advantage, we
also show that there are reasons for an incumbency disadvantage.
3 The model
We consider a three-period model in which any decision has to be made for two
periods in a row. Ptj ∈ {a,b} is the policy implemented in period t and started
in period j,w i t ht = j,j +1 , j =1 ,2,3. More precisely, a politician has to make
the following policy decisions: in period one, P11 ∈ {a,b},i np e r i o dt w o ,b o t h
P21 ∈ {a,b} and P22 ∈ {a,b}, and in period three, P32 ∈ {a,b} and P33 ∈ {a,b}.
The outcome of the policy started in period j, implemented either in period j
or in period j +1 , only depends on the state of the world θj ∈ {a,b}. Citizens
have homogeneous preferences and can thus be treated as a single player (from here
on “the society”). When a politician implements the correct policy, i.e., Ptj = θj,
t = j,j +1, the society receives a payoﬀ of 1; otherwise, it receives a zero payoﬀ.I t
is common knowledge that P (θj = a)=P (θj = b)=1
2, j =1 ,2,3,w i t hθj being
stochastically independent of θτ,w i t hj 6= τ, so ex-ante there is no a popular policy
for the society.
Politicians get a utility R simply from being in oﬃce. However, if they maximize
social welfare they also receive a utility G.W h e n h e i s n o t i n o ﬃce, a politician
receives a reservation utility which is normalized to zero. β is the discount factor.
Politicians may be either high quality (H)o rl o wq u a l i t y( L). The politician’s
quality is private information. The probability that a politician is high quality is
p ∈ (0,1). The politician in oﬃce in period t receives a private signal sP
tj ∈ {a,b},
P = H,L, on the state of the world θj, t = j,j +1 . A high-quality politician’s
signal is always perfect, i.e., prob(sH
tj = θj |θj )=1 , t = j,j +1 . A low-quality
politician’s signal on the state of the world in period t = j is informative but not
perfect: prob(sL
jj = θj |θj )=1




(we will study for simplicity the case
where φ → 0), while the signal sL
j+1j in period t = j +1on the state of the world
in the previous period is perfect, i.e., prob(sL
j+1j = θj |θj )=1 .
As in Maskin and Tirole (2004), we assume that there exists a fraction ε of
7politicians (with ε → 05) who are only interested in selecting the best policy. Let
us call them nonstrategic politicians. A proportion p of these politicians are high
quality, while the remainder 1 − p are low quality.
At the end of period j the society receives a private signal sV
j ∈ {a,b} on the
state of the world θj. Such a signal is informative only in the limit, i.e., prob(sV
j =
θj |θj )=1
2 + γ,w i t hγ → 0. γ goes to zero faster than ε.
The candidates who run for election at the end of period t, t =1 ,2,a r et h e
incumbent politician and a pool of identical politicians whose reputation is p.I n
addition, there is a probability q ∈ [0,1] that a politician who was voted out of
oﬃce at the end of period 1 will run for the election at the end of period 2.
The game has the following timing:
(i) at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, Nature (N) chooses the state of the world
(in that period) θ1 ∈ {a,b},w i t hP (θ1 = a)=1
2 (this probability is commonly
known);
(ii) at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, Nature (N)a l s oc h o o s e st h et y p eo ft h e
politician T1 ∈ {H,L},w i t hP (T1 = H)=p ∈ (0,1) (this probability is commonly
known);
(iii) at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, T1 = H observes θ1, while T1 = L receives
the signal sL
11. The politician, who knows his type, has to choose the policy P11 ∈
{a,b};
(iv) at the end of the ﬁrst period, the society (S)o b s e r v e sP11 and sV
1 .T h e n i t
chooses whether to reelect the incumbent politician or elect a new politician;
(v) at the beginning of the second period, if the incumbent politician was reelected,
T2 = T1, while if a new politician was elected, Nature (N)c h o o s e st h et y p eo f
the new politician T2 ∈ {H,L},w i t hP (T2 = H)=p ∈ (0,1) (this probability is
commonly known);
(vi) at the beginning of the second period, Nature (N) chooses the state of the world
(in that period) θ2 ∈ {a,b},w i t hP (θ2 = a)=1
2 (this probability is commonly
known). θ2 is stochastically independent of θ1;
(vii) at the beginning of the second period, T2 = H observes θ2,w h i l eT2 = L
receives the signal sL
22.M o r e o v e r ,T2 observes the (old) state of the world θ1. T2
has to choose both the policy P21 ∈ {a,b} and the policy P22 ∈ {a,b};
(viii) at the end of the second period, the society (S) observes the policies P21 ∈
{a,b} and P22 ∈ {a,b},a sw e l la st h es i g n a lsV
2 .I f q =0 , it chooses whether to
reelect the incumbent politician or elect a new politician, while if q>0 it might
also reelect the old politician who was voted out of oﬃce at the end of period 1;
(ix) at the beginning of the third period, if the old politician was reelected, T3 = T2,
while if a new politician was elected, Nature (N) chooses the type of the new
politician T3 ∈ {H,L},w i t hP (T3 = H)=p ∈ (0,1) (this probability is commonly
known);
5The results of the paper obtain even when ε is positive but not too large.
8(x) at the beginning of the third period, T3 = H observes θ3,w h i l eT3 = L receives
the signal sL
33.M o r e o v e r , T3 observes the (old) state of the world θ2. T3 has to
choose both the policy P32 ∈ {a,b} and the policy P33 ∈ {a,b}.
We have a dynamic game with incomplete information. The solution concept
we will use is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth PBE).
When a politician makes a policy decision for the ﬁrst time, there is no an ex-
ante popular policy, so it is quite reasonable to make the (equilibrium) assumption
that the incumbent politician always maximizes social welfare.
Assumption 1 In period t, a high-quality politician chooses the correct policy (i.e.,
Ptt = θt), while a low-quality politician follows his (imperfectly) informative
signal (i.e., Ptt = sL
tt).
4M o d e l w i t h G =0
In this section, we consider the model where politicians only care about reelection,
i.e., G =0 . Politicians receive a positive utility R only from holding political oﬃce,
so they are interested in maximizing their expected probability of being reelected.
Whenever the incumbent politician is indiﬀerent between diﬀerent policies, we as-
sume that he implements the policy preferred by the society.
In the ﬁrst subsection, we characterize the PBE of the game when q =0 ;i nt h e
second subsection, we analyze the case where q>0.
4.1 Policy persistence
In this subsection, we assume that once ousted from oﬃce, a politician cannot run
again for election (i.e., q =0 ). We show that equilibrium exhibits a perverse policy
persistence: a politician who implemented a given policy in the past has an incentive
to continue such a policy in the future even when he realizes that it is not the best
policy for the society. Indeed, changing his mind involves worsening his reputation,
and thus reduces his probability of being reelected. It turns out therefore to be
optimal for the society to elect a new politician, because his behavior is not aﬀected
by the past decisions of another politician.
We start with the decision of the politician who holds the oﬃce in the third
period. The incumbent politician has to make both the policy decision P32 (the
policy started in period two) and the policy decision P33 (the policy that starts in
that period). In the last period, there is no reelection concern, so the incumbent





32, P = H,L6.
6As we will show later, the main results of the paper also obtain in a more general setting with
inﬁnitely repeated elections and no term limit.
9Both high- and low-quality politicians know which policy P32 is the best for the
society (they know the state of the world θ2). As for the policy P33, a high-quality
politician has a better information (he knows the state of the world θ3)t h a na
low-quality politician (his signal sL
33 is informative but far from perfect). Hence,
at the end of the second period, it is optimal for the society to elect the candidate
with the best reputation, i.e., the one who is more likely to be high quality.
The politician in oﬃce in period two has to make both the policy decision P21 ∈
{a,b} and the policy decision P22 ∈ {a,b}. From assumption 1, he will choose the




As for the decision on the policy started in the previous period (i.e., P21), it
can be thought as the choice between continuing the policy introduced in the ﬁrst
period (i.e., P21 = P11) and removing it and implementing the other policy (i.e.,
P21 6= P11)8.
Definition 4.1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium exhibits Partial Policy Persistence
(PPP) of the incumbent politician if (and only if) he persists in implementing the
ﬁrst-period policy only when this is actually optimal for the society, i.e., he chooses
P21 = P11 if (and only if) sP
21 = θ1, P = H,L.
Suppose that the incumbent politician was reelected at the end of the ﬁrst
period. This means that the politician who holds the oﬃce in period two is the
same politician who introduced the policy P11 (throughout the paper we will refer
to the incumbent politician in period one simply as the old politician). Imagine
moreover that an equilibrium exhibits PPP of the old politician. In this case the
society can draw inferences about the type of the old politician from his choice:
if he removed the ﬁrst-period policy, i.e., P21 6= P11, he makes it apparent that
he made a mistake in period one, so the society infers that such politician has a
low-quality (from assumption 1, only a low-quality politician can make a mistake in
period one), and does not reelect him. On the other hand, if a politician continued
the past policy, i.e., P21 = P11, in the equilibrium under consideration the society
positively updates its beliefs about the politician’s type: the probability that the
incumbent politician is high-quality becomes
p
p +( 1− p)1
2
>p ,
7Since ex-ante there is no a popular policy for the society (i.e., P (θ2 = a)=P (θ2 = b)=1
2)
and the society’s signal sV
2 on the state of the world θ2 is informative only in the limit, the society
learns nothing about the politician’s type from his choice P22.
8The reasoning made for the policy choice P22 cannot be apply to the policy choice P21.I na
world characterized by persistence of the state of the world, the choice of removing or continuing
the ﬁrst-period policy P11 may tell the society something about the correctness of the past decision,
and so about the type of the politician who took it. This in turn could modify the incentives of
the politician in oﬃce in the second period to choose the correct policy.
10so the society reelects him. We have shown that, in the equilibrium under consid-
eration, the society reelects the old politician if (and only if) he continued the past
policy. However, since politicians only care about their reelection (i.e., G =0 ), a
low-quality politician who observed θ1 6= P11 would never ﬁnd it optimal to remove
the policy P11, thus contradicting the assumption that in equilibrium there is PPP.
As a conclusion,
Proposition 4.1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if G =0 , there cannot exist
PPP of the old politician.
Changing his mind worsens the politician’s reputation, so we expect that in
equilibrium an old politician never removes the ﬁrst-period policy (i.e., he always
chooses P21 = P11). When this occurs we will say that the equilibrium exhibits Full
Policy Persistence (FPP) of the old politician. The following proposition conﬁrms
this conjecture.
Proposition 4.2 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if G =0 ,t h e r ei sF P Po ft h e
old politician.
PROP. 4.2 shows that equilibrium exhibits a perverse policy persistence: in
order to maintain his reputation, a (low-quality) politician will not remove a policy
he introduced in the past even when doing so would be socially optimal9.O fc o u r s e ,
if the society chose to reelect the old politician at the end of the ﬁrst period, it would
learn nothing about his quality from his second-period choice (he always chooses
P21 = P11), so there would be no selection eﬀect.
A necessary condition for the existence of a perverse policy persistence is that
the politician who holds the oﬃce has already made some decisions in the past.
By deﬁnition, a politician who never held the oﬃce in the past never made any
decision10. We expect therefore that in equilibrium the new politician will always
choose the correct policy, i.e., P21 = θ1. Indeed,
Proposition 4.3 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if G =0and q =0 ,t h e r ei s
PPP of the new politician.
9It is worth noting that, for this result to hold, it is not necessary to assume that in the ﬁrst
period a high-quality politician knows the state of the world θ1 while a low-quality politician does
not, but it is suﬃcient that the former receives a more informative signal than the one received
by the latter, so that it continues to be more likely that in the ﬁrst period a low-quality politician
makes a mistake than a high-quality politician. In such a case, there would exist a problem of
perverse policy persistence also for a high-quality politician. This would occur even if there was a
partial persistence of the state of the world.
10Unlike the old politician, a new politician has no diﬃculties in removing the (eventually wrong)
ﬁrst-period policy. Indeed, the policy P11 was not introduced by himself, so the decision to remove
such a policy does not aﬀect his reputation.
11If at the end of the ﬁrst period the society elected a new politician, it would
learn nothing about his quality from his second-period choice P21 (high- and low-
politicians know the correct policy and choose it with the same probability, i.e.,
with probability one), so also in this case there would be no selection eﬀect.
If the society reelects the old politician, reelection concern will induce him to
never remove the ﬁrst-period policy (PROP. 4.2). On the other hand, a new politi-
cian, who did not make any decision in past times, always implements the socially
optimal policy (PROP. 4.3). In either case, there is no selection eﬀect, so it is
optimal for the society to elect a new politician.
Proposition 4.4 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at the end of the ﬁrst period,
if G =0and q =0 , the society elects a new politician11.
Should the paper end here, we would conclude that the society should never
reelect the incumbent politician, so there would exist an incumbency disadvantage.
Although this seems a clear and appealing result, it would be a quite strong con-
clusion, especially given the empirical evidence on the existence of an incumbency
advantage (see, e.g., Erikson 1971 and Mayhew 1974). However, as we will see, the
conclusion is not so straightforward as it might appear.
In the next subsection, we will assume that there is a positive probability that
a politician who was voted out of oﬃce in the past will stand for reelection in the
future and show that an equilibrium always exhibits a perverse policy unpersistence
of the new politician, who never continues the ﬁrst-period policy P11 in order not to
improve the old politician’s reputation even when doing so would be socially optimal.
At the end of the ﬁrst-period it will therefore turn out to be optimal for the society
to reelect the incumbent politician, even though he will persist in implementing the
ﬁrst-period policy. Hence, in this case there will exist an incumbency advantage.
4.2 Policy unpersistence
So far we have supposed that when a politician is voted out of oﬃce, he cannot
stand for reelection in the future. In this subsection, we relax this assumption by
allowing politicians to stand for election even when they were voted out of oﬃce in
a past period. More precisely, we assume that there exists a positive probability
(i.e., q>0) that the old politician who was ousted from oﬃce at the end of the
ﬁrst period will run again for election at the end of the second period. Under this
assumption, we will characterize the PBE of the game.
Note ﬁrstly that in the third period the incumbent politician’s decision does not
change: he always maximizes social welfare. Thus, at the end of the second period
11In the Mathematical Appendix we show that there exists a Markov perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the overlapping generation model with a term limit of 3 periods where: (i) the society
never reelects the incumbent politician (who would persist in implementing the previous policy in
the next period) and (ii) the incumbent politician always maximizes social welfare (PROP. A.4.1).
12the society will elect the candidate who is more likely to have a high quality.
At the end of the ﬁrst period, if the old politician was reelected, the candidates
who stand for reelection at the end of the second period are a pool of new politicians
and the old politician, exactly as in the model with q =0 , so once again any
equilibrium exhibits FPP of the old politician (PROP. 4.2). On the other hand,
if at the end of the ﬁrst period the old politician was voted out of oﬃce, there is
uncertainty about the candidates who will stand for election at the end of the second
period: with probability q, they will be the old politician, the (new) incumbent
politician in period two and a pool of new politicians, while with probability 1−q,
they will only be the (new) incumbent politician in period two and a pool of new
politicians.
Let us now consider the decision of the (new) incumbent politician in period two
(henceforth, whenever it does not create confusion, new politician) on the policy
started in the previous period (i.e., P21). Imagine that an equilibrium exhibits PPP
of the new politician, that is he always chooses the policy that maximizes social
welfare (P21 = θ1). At the end of the second period the society will learn nothing
about the type of the politician from his choice, so the probability the society
will attach to the incumbent politician being high ability will stay constant at p.
From this point of view, the society will be indiﬀerent between reelecting the (new)
incumbent politician in period two and electing a new politician. Its preference
between the two politicians will therefore depend on the signal sV
2 about the state
of the world θ2 (informative only in the limit). With probability 1 − q the society
will have to choose whether to reelect the (new) incumbent politician in period two
or elect a new politician: in this case the incumbent politician will be reelected if
(and only if) P22 = sV
2 , which occurs with probability 1
2 (see PROP. A.1.1 in the
Mathematical Appendix).
In an equilibrium exhibiting PPP, the new politician always implements the
policy P21 = θ1, P = H,L, so by observing the policy P21, the society infers the
(old) state of the world θ1
12. But then the society could use this information to
update its beliefs on the old politician’s type: if P21 = P11,t h e nP11 = θ1,s ot h e
probability that the old politician has a high quality would be
p
p +( 1− p)1
2
>p
The society would therefore prefer the old politician in period one to both the
new politician in period two and the pool of new politicians. On the other hand,
if P21 6= P11,t h e nP11 6= θ1, so the probability that the old politician has a high
quality is 0.
With probability q the society will have to choose among the old politician,
12Note that this reasoning was also true in the previous section. However, in that case it was
not relevant for the characterization of the PBE, because the old politician who was voted out of
oﬃce at the end of the ﬁrst period could not run again in the next elections.
13the (new) incumbent politician in period two and a politician from the pool of
new politicians. If P21 = P11, it will choose to elect the old politician, while if
P21 6= P11, it will reelect the (new) incumbent politician if sV
2 = P22 (which occurs
with probability 1
2) and a new politician if sV
2 6= P22. Politicians only care about
their reelection (i.e., G =0 ), so the new politician will undertake the action that
maximizes his expected probability of being reelected. If he chooses P21 = P11,h i s
expected probability of being reelected is
q · 0+( 1− q) ·
1
2




+( 1− q) ·
1
2
For any q>0, the new politician maximizes his probability of being reelected by
choosing P21 6= P11, thus contradicting the equilibrium under consideration, which
would call for the new politician to choose P21 = P11 whenever P11 = θ1.A s a
conclusion,
Proposition 4.5 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if G =0 ,f o ra n yq>0 there
exists no PPP of the new politician.
By continuing the policy introduced in the ﬁrst period by the old politician, the
new politician would send the society a good signal about the old politician’s quality,
so we expect that in equilibrium he will always choose to remove the ﬁrst-period
policy P11. When this occurs, we will say that equilibrium exhibits Full Policy
Unpersistence (FPU) of the new politician. The following proposition conﬁrms this
conjecture.
Proposition 4.6 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if G =0 ,f o ra n yq>0 there
is FPU of the new politician.
PROP. 4.6 shows that equilibrium exhibits a perverse policy unpersistence: in
order not to improve the reputation of a potential rival in the next elections, a
politician does not continue a policy introduced by another politician while doing
so would be socially optimal.
If the society elects a new politician at the end of the ﬁrst period, it will learn
nothing about his quality from his second-period choice (he always chooses P21 6=
P11): at the end of the second-period, the probability that the elected politician has
a high quality stays constant at p13,s oa l s oi nt h i sc a s et h e r ei sn oselection eﬀect.
13In equilibrium, the winner of the second-period elections will be either the (new) incumbent
politician in period two or a new politician (depending on the signal sV
22 the society will receive),
who have both a reputation of p.P R O P .A.2.1 in the Mathematical Appendix shows that, in the
limit when ε → 0,i fP21 6= P11, at the end of the second period the old politician will never be
reelected.
14If the society reelects the incumbent politician, he will always implement the
ﬁrst-period policy (PROP. 4.2), while the new politician will always remove it
(PROP. 4.6). In both cases, there is no selection eﬀect, so the society’s voting de-
cision can be seen as the choice between the ﬁrst-period policy (i.e., P21 = P11)a n d
the other policy (i.e., P21 6= P11). The society will therefore reelect the candidate
who will implement in the second period the policy that has become popular, i.e.,
the policy that would be implemented by the society itself, given its information.
From assumption 1, when a policy decision is made for the ﬁrst time, the incum-
bent politician chooses the policy that corresponds to the most likely state. Since
politicians are assumed to have policy expertise, the society believes it is more likely
that the ﬁrst-period policy is the correct one. It is therefore optimal to elect the
candidate who will implement it, i.e., the incumbent politician14.
Proposition 4.7 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at the end of the ﬁrst period,
if G =0 , for any q>0 the society always reelects the old politician15.
This result is consistent with the strong empirical evidence on the existence of an
incumbency advantage. The interesting feature of our result is that the existence of
such an advantage does not depend on an opportunistic behavior by the politician.
In this section, we have carried out the analysis under the assumption that politi-
cians are only self-interested, i.e., they only care about reelection. Although this
assumption is in the tradition of the public choice theory, it might seem too strong.
In the next section, we consider a more general model in which politicians not only
care about reelection, but also about maximizing social welfare. We show that
holding oﬃce may give the incumbent candidate an advantage or a disadvantage
over a new challenger depending on the probability that the incumbent candidate
will run for reelection in the future.
5M o d e l w i t h G>0
In this section, politicians are still self-interested (they receive a utility R from hold-
ing oﬃce), but now they also receive a per-period positive utility (G>0) whenever
they choose the policy that maximizes social welfare, given their information.
14Note also that the old high-quality politician is now expected to behave better in the second
period than the new high-quality politician: the former always chooses the correct policy, while
the latter does not whenever θ1 = P11.
15In the Mathematical Appendix we show for q =1that there may exist a Markov perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the game with inﬁnitely repeated elections and no term limit where:
(i) the society always reelects the incumbent politician and (ii) the incumbent politician always
persists in implementing the previous policy in the next period (PROP. A.4.2).
15T om a k et h ea n a l y s i si n t e r e s t i n g ,w ea s s u m et h a t 16
β (R +2 G) >G (5.1)
If a politician maximized social welfare when G =0 , a fortiori he would do so
if G>0. Hence, the politician who holds the oﬃce in period three will always
maximize social welfare. As a consequence, at the end of the second period it will
still be optimal for the society to elect the candidate who is more likely to have a
high quality.
Consider now the old politician’s second-period decision on the policy started
in period one. As in the case in which G =0 , equilibrium still exhibits FPP of the
old politician.
Proposition 5.1 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if β (R +2 G) >G , for any
q ∈ [0,1] there exists FPP of the old politician.
The condition β (R +2 G) >Gimplies that a politician ﬁnds it worthwhile to
choose the wrong policy and be reelected rather than maximize social welfare and be
voted out of oﬃce. In equilibrium, changing his mind worsens the old politician’s
reputation, so the society reelects the old politician if (and only if) he chooses
P21 = P11. Therefore, in order to maintain his reputation, the old politician never
removes the ﬁrst-period policy.
As we saw in the previous section, when G =0 ,i fq =0the new politician in
oﬃce in period two maximizes social welfare (PROP. 4.3), while if q>0 equilibrium
exhibits FPU of the new politician (PROP. 4.6). An arbitrary small probability
that the old politician would run for reelection at the end of the second period was
therefore suﬃcient to induce the new politician to always remove the ﬁrst-period
policy. In this section, G>0, so the new politician has a motive for maximizing
social welfare. Hence, we expect that equilibrium may exhibit PPP even when q is
positive. The following proposition conﬁrms this intuition.
Proposition 5.2 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if q> 2G
β(R+2G),w h i c hc a l l s
for β (R +2 G) > 2G, there exists FPU of the new politician; otherwise, there exists
PPP of the new politician.
As in the model with G =0 , in equilibrium, by choosing P21 6= P11 the new
politician maximizes his expected probability of being reelected. When G>0,h ei s
also interested in maximizing social welfare, so he could now choose P21 = P11 even
when q>0. Of course, the new politician who observed sP
21 = θ1 6= P11, P = H,L,
always chooses P21 6= P11: by so doing, he maximizes both social welfare and his
probability of being reelected. On the other hand, a new politician who observed
16Should the payoﬀ from remaining in oﬃce in period three (β (R +2 G))n o to ﬀset the loss from
not choosing the correct policy in period two (G), the politician who held the oﬃce in period two
would maximize social welfare, whatever his type, so reelection concern would play no role at all.
16sP
21 = θ1 = P11, P = H,L,w o u l df a c eat r a d e - o ﬀ between maximizing social welfare
and maximizing his probability of being reelected.
Let
y ≡
β (R +2 G)
G
> 1 (from inequality 5.1)
be the ratio of the politician’s payoﬀ from remaining in oﬃce in period three and
the payoﬀ he obtains if he chooses the correct policy P21 = θ1 in period two. As
in Maskin and Tirole (2004), y can be interpreted as a measure of the politicians’
eagerness to hold onto power. The new politician’s behavior will depend on the











Figure 1: The new politician’s second-period behavior
When q =0 , the new politician is not concerned about the old politician’s
reputation, so equilibrium always exhibits PPP of the new politician. However,
when q>0, equilibrium may now exhibit FPU of the new politician; this occurs
when such a politician is suﬃciently interested in holding oﬃce in period three (i.e.,
y is high enough) or when it is suﬃciently likely that the old politician will stand
for election at the end of the second-period (i.e., q is high enough), provided y is
not too low (i.e., y>2).
We can now ask who will be the winner of the ﬁrst-period election. At the
end of the ﬁrst period, the incumbent politician has the same reputation as a new
politician. Hence, in making its voting decision the society considers both the
expected payoﬀ the elected politician would give the society in the second period and
whether it would learn something about the types of the candidates from the elected
politician’s (equilibrium) behavior (selection eﬀect). When equilibrium exhibits
PPP of the new politician, the society does not reelect the old politician (there
is an incumbency disadvantage). By so doing, it will receive a higher expected
payoﬀ in the second period (a new politician maximizes social welfare, while the
incumbent politician always chooses P21 = P11); moreover, with positive probability
it will learn the type of the old politician from the new politician’s choice. On
the other hand, when equilibrium exhibits FPU of the new politician, the society
reelects the old politician (there is an incumbency advantage), although he will never
17remove the past policy (the ﬁrst-period policy was selected by an expert politician).
The following proposition provides mathematical conditions for both incumbency
advantage and incumbency disadvantage.
Proposition 5.3 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, if q> 2G
β(R+2G),w h i c hc a l l s
for β (R +2 G) > 2G,a tt h ee n do ft h eﬁrst period the society elects the incumbent












Figure 2: The winning candidate at the ﬁrst-period election
When G>0, the result of the election that takes place at the end of the ﬁrst
period may depend on the value of the parameter q. In particular, if y is not too
low (i.e., y>2), the winner of the electoral competition is the incumbent politician
if (and only if) q is suﬃciently high.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some basic assumptions and propose some extensions of
the model. Attention should be drawn, in particular, to two assumptions. First, the
existence of incomplete information is a key assumption: without policy uncertainty,
the incumbent politician’s behavior would not aﬀect his reputation, while without
politician uncertainty the incumbent politician would have no reason to worry about
his reputation (for a more detailed discussion, see Coate and Morris 1995). Second,
the existence of persistence of the state of the world is also crucial to our results.
Without persistence of the state of the world, the optimality of continuing the
previous policy is not related to the optimality of introducing it. Voters could learn
nothing about the previous politician from the incumbent politician’s choice, and so
we would have neither perverse policy persistence nor perverse policy unpersistence.
Our model is applicable to a variety of economic situations in which a plurality
of agents compete with each other to gain the opportunity of interacting with a
18principal. For instance, our model can be easily extended to a decision maker-
advisor setting (policy advisors, management consultants, etc.).
In the political context, the assumption that the nonincumbent candidates ob-
serve the incumbent politician’s behavior seems quite reasonable. However, in other
contexts it might appear more natural to assume that the nonincumbent agents
know the incumbent agent’s behavior only if the principal chooses to convey such
an information to them. In the light of our ﬁndings, in order to preserve the new
agent’s impartiality, the principal should refrain from conveying this information.
Unfortunately, the lack of this information might jeopardize the new agent’s work,
and so the advantage to switch to a new agent. Consider, for example, a patient
who has to decide whether to change his doctor. If the patient tells the diagnosis
and the treatment prescribed by the old doctor to the new doctor, the latter may
have an incentive to contradict the former. On the other hand, hiding the past
treatment might invalidate the new diagnosis (blood test modiﬁed by the previous
treatment, symptoms generated by the previous treatment rather than by the dis-
ease, etc.). Thus we cannot say ap r i o r iwhich is the optimal thing to do. In this
case, incumbency would be advantageous whenever the risks related to the lack of
this information oﬀset the beneﬁts of having a more impartial doctor.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies political decision-making in a context characterized by persis-
tence of the state of the world. The introduction of this assumption, which is a
novelty in the literature on electoral accountability, gives rise to some appealing
and intuitive results. First, the past behavior of a politician may negatively aﬀect
not only his future behavior (perverse policy persistence), but also the future be-
havior of other politicians (perverse policy unpersistence). Second, the incumbent
politician’s behavior may be taken by the voters as an indicator of his future be-
havior. The discrepancy in the candidates’ expected behavior determines whether
the incumbent politician has an advantage or a disadvantage over a new challenger.
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20A. Mathematical Appendix
A.1. Model with G =0and q =0
PROOF OF PROP. 4.2. Fix ε>0.W eﬁrstly show that the situation in
which an old strategic politician always chooses P21 = P11,w h a t e v e rh i st y p e ,i sa
PBE. The probability that a politician is high quality conditional on P21 = P11 is
p[ε +( 1− ε)]
p[ε +( 1− ε)] + (1 − p)
£
ε1
2 +( 1− ε)
¤ >p
for any ε>0, so the society will reelect him. By contrast, the probability that a
politician is high quality conditional on P21 6= P11 is 0 (only a nonstrategic low-
quality politician chooses P21 6= P11), so the society will not reelect him. Thus, the
old strategic politician always chooses P21 = P11, and the situation described in the
proposition is actually a PBE.
We now demonstrate that this is the unique PBE of the game. PROP. 4.1 shows
that there cannot exist a PBE displaying PPP of the old politician. Thus we
have only to show that there cannot exist a PBE where the old strategic politician
always17 chooses P21 6= P11. Suppose this is the case. The probability that a
politician is high quality conditional on P21 6= P11 is
p(1 − ε)
p(1 − ε)+( 1− p)
£
ε1
2 +( 1− ε)
¤ <p
for any ε>0, so the society will not reelect him. By contrast, the probability
that a politician is high quality conditional on P21 = P11 is 1 (only a nonstrategic
high-quality politician chooses P21 = P11), so the society will reelect him. Thus,
the strategic politician chooses P21 = P11. A contradiction.
P R O O FO FP R O P .4 . 3 . Fix ε>0. By assumption, in the second period
the (new) incumbent politician observes the state of the world θ1 whatever his type,
i.e., sP
21 = θ1, P = H,L. In equilibrium, as for the policy P21 high- and low-quality
strategic politicians play the same strategy, given the state of the world θ1 (they
choose the action that maximizes their probability of being reelected (G =0 ), and
whenever indiﬀerent between two policies, by assumption, they maximize social
welfare). Since high- and low-quality nonstrategic politicians also play the same
strategy, after observing P21, the society is therefore indiﬀerent between reelecting
the (new) incumbent politician and electing a new one (they are the same reputation
p), so it reelects the former if (and only if) it receives the signal sV
2 = P22 (see
PROP. A.1.1). Hence, in equilibrium the new politician always maximizes social
welfare, i.e., he chooses P21 = θ1.
17By assumption, whenever a politician is indiﬀerent between two policies, he chooses the policy
preferred by the society, so he never randomizes.
21Proposition A.1.1. Suppose that, after observing P21,t h es o c i e t yi si n d i ﬀerent
between reelecting the (new) incumbent politician and electing a new politician. In
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in the limit when γ → 0,t h e( n e w )i n c u m b e n t
politician will be reelected if (and only if) the society will receive the signal sV
2 = P22.
P R O O FO FP R O P .A.1.1. Let γ>0. Suppose that the probability that the
(new) incumbent politician is high quality conditional on P21 is p.F r o ma s s u m p t i o n
1, as for the policy P22 the (new) incumbent politician in oﬃce in period 2 always
maximizes social welfare: the high-quality politician always chooses P22 = θ2,w h i l e
the low-quality politician always chooses P22 = sL
22. Given these strategies, after
observing sV










+( 1− p) 1
2
>p
for any γ>0, so the society will reelect the (new) incumbent politician. By contrast,
after observing sV
2 6= P22 the society believes that the (new) incumbent politician







+( 1− p) 1
2
<p
for any γ>0, so the society will not reelect him.
P R O O FO FP R O P .4 . 4 . The equilibrium expected utility evaluated at the
beginning of period t =2from reelecting the old politician is
EUS



















The equilibrium expected utility evaluated at the beginning of period t =2from
electing a new politician is
EUS






















it follows immediately that EUS
2 (old,q =0 )<E U S
2 (new,q =0 ) .
A.2. Model with G =0and q>0
Proposition A.2.1. Suppose that the old politician, who lose the ﬁrst-period elec-
tions, at the end of the second period competes for election. In a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which there is FPU of the new politician, in the limit when ε → 0,
22at the end of the second period the society reelects the old politician if (and only if)
t h en e wo n ec h o s eP21 = P11.
P R O O FO FP R O P .A.2.1. Fix ε>0. In a PBE displaying FPU of
the new politician a new strategic politician in oﬃce in period 2 always chooses
P21 6= P11. After observing the new politician’s second period choice P21,t h e
society learns something about the true state of the world θ1, and so about the
correctness of the old politician’s ﬁrst-period choice P11.S p e c i ﬁcally, if the society
observed P21 = P11, the probability that the state of the world is θ1 = P11 becomes
1 (only a new nonstrategic politician who observed θ1 = P11 chooses P21 = P11,
so the society infers that the old politician made the correct policy, i.e., P11 = θ1).
Given the old politician’s ﬁrst-period equilibrium strategy described in assumption
1, the probability that the old politician is high quality conditional on P21 = P11
having been implemented by the new politician is
p[ε +( 1− ε)]
p[ε +( 1− ε)] + (1 − p)[ε +( 1− ε)]1
2
>p
for any ε>0, so the society will reelect the old politician. On the other hand, if the










for any ε>0. Given the old politician’s ﬁrst-period equilibrium strategy described
in assumption 1, the probability that the old politician is high quality conditional
on P21 6= P11 having been implemented by the new politician is
p[ε +( 1− ε)]˜ x




for any ε>0, so the society will not reelect the old politician.
PROOF OF PROP. 4.6. Fix ε>0.W eﬁrstly show that the situation in
which the new strategic politician always chooses P21 6= P11,w h a t e v e rh i st y p e ,i s
aP B E .F r o mPROP. A.2.1, at the end of the second period the old politician will
be reelected if (and only if) the new politician chose P21 = P11. Thus if the society
observes P21 6= P11,t h e ni tr e e l e c t st h en e wp o l i t i c i a ni f( a n do n l yi f )sV
2 = P22
(see PROP. A.1.1.). In the limit when γ → 0, the new politician who chooses





for any P = H,L. The (limiting) expected probability of being reelected from











On the other hand, if the society observes P21 = P11 and the old politician stands for
reelection (which occurs with probability q), then it reelects the old politician, while
if the old politician does not stand for reelection (which occurs with probability
231 − q), it reelects the new politician if (and only if) sV
2 = P22. The (limiting)
expected probability of being reelected from choosing P21 = P11 is therefore







For any q>0, EQU. A.2.2 is smaller than EQU. A.2.1, so the new politician always
chooses P21 6= P11. Hence, the situation described in the proposition is actually a
PBE.
We now demonstrate that it is the unique PBE of the game. PROP. 4.5 shows that
there cannot exist a PBE displaying PPP of the new politician. Thus we only have
to show that there cannot exist a PBE where the new politician always chooses
P21 = P11 (see footnote 13). Suppose there exists such a PBE. The probability
that the old politician is high quality conditional on P21 6= P11 is zero (only a
nonstrategic politician who observed θ1 6= P11 chooses P21 6= P11, so the society
infers from the new politician’s choice that in the ﬁrst period the old politician made
a mistake). Hence, if the new politician chose P21 6= P11, then the society never
reelects the old politician. The expected probability that the new politician will be
reelected is 1
2, which is the maximum possible value. Hence, the new politician who
observed θ1 6= P11 chooses P21 6= P11, a contradiction.
P R O O FO FP R O P .4 . 7 . The equilibrium expected utility evaluated at the
beginning of period t =2from reelecting the old politician is equal to EUS
2 (old,q =
0) (EQU. A.1.1). After straightforward manipulations EQU. A.1.1 can be rewritten
as
EUS












The expected utility evaluated at the beginning of period t =2from electing a new
politician is
EUS



























it follows immediately that EUS
2 (old,q > 0) >E U S
2 (new,q > 0).
A.3. Model with G>0 and q>0
P R O O FO FP R O P .5 . 1 . Fix ε>0.W eﬁrstly claim that a strategic politi-
cian in oﬃce in period two cannot be indiﬀerent in equilibrium between choosing
P21 = P11 and P21 6= P11. Suppose that he is indiﬀerent between the two policies.
By inequality (4.1), this calls for the society randomizes over reelection, which in
turn calls for the society is indiﬀerent to choose whether to reelect the incumbent
politician or another politician. But if the society is actually indiﬀerent after ob-
serving P21, then it will make its voting decision only on the basis of the signal sV
2 .
24I tt u r n so u tt h e r e f o r et ob eo p t i m a lf o r the incumbent politician to choose P21 = θ1,
a contradiction. Hence, the incumbent politician in equilibrium is never indiﬀerent,
and so he always chooses a pure strategy.
Notice now that, in the limit when γ → 0, in period two an old strategic high-quality
politician who observed θ1 = P11 has an objective function that is identical to that
of an old strategic low-quality politician who observed the same state of the world
(they have the same information as for the optimality of the policy P21, obtain the
same utility G from maximizing social welfare, and will be reelected with the same
probability (1
2) whenever the society makes its voting decision only on the basis of
the signal sV
2 ). Since in equilibrium a politician is never indiﬀerent, then high and
low-quality politicians always choose the same (pure) strategy, given the state of
the world θ1 = P11. As a consequence, the only equilibrium possibilities are: PPP,
FPP, and FPU of the old politician.
We now claim that, in a PBE, the old politician will be reelected if (and only if) he
chose P21 = P11. The probability that the old politician is high quality conditional
on P21 = P11 is always strictly greater than p (thanks to the fact that the probabil-
ity that a nonstrategic politician is high quality conditional on him having chosen
P21 = P11 is strictly greater than p), and so the society reelects him. By contrast,
the probability that the old politician is high quality conditional on P21 6= P11 is
always strictly smaller than p (thanks to the fact that the probability that a non-
strategic politician is high quality conditional on him having chosen P21 6= P11 is
zero), and so the society does not reelect him.
Given the above society’s equilibrium strategies, equilibrium displays FPP by the
strategic old politician. By choosing P21 = P11 a strategic politician who observed
θ1 = P11 maximizes both his second-period payoﬀ and his probability of being re-
elected. The expected utility for the strategic politician who observed θ1 6= P11
from choosing P21 = P11 is
EUold
θ16=P11(P21 = P11)=( 0+R)+G + β(R +2 G),
while that from choosing P21 6= P11 is
EUold
θ16=P11(P21 6= P11)=( G + R)+G.
The old politician who observed θ1 6= P11 chooses P21 = P11 (i.e., equilibrium dis-
plays FPP of the old politician) if (and only if) EUold
θ16=P11(P21 = P11) >E U old
θ16=P11(P21 6=
P11) ⇔ β(R +2 G) >G .
P R O O FO FP R O P .5 . 2 . Fix ε>0.I n t h e PROOF OF PROP.5 . 1w e
already have demonstrated that the incumbent politician in equilibrium is never
indiﬀerent, and so he always chooses a pure strategy.
Notice now that, in the limit when γ → 0, in period two the new strategic high-
quality politician who observed θ1 ∈ {a,b} has an objective function that is identical
to that of the new low-quality strategic politician who observed the same state of
the world (they have the same information as for the optimality of the policy P21,
25obtain the same utility G from maximizing social welfare, and will be reelected with
t h es a m ep r o b a b i l i t y( 1
2) if the society makes its voting decision only on the basis
of the signal sV
2 ). Thus, after choosing P21, the incumbent politician always has a
reputation of p, and the society is indiﬀerent between reelecting him and electing a
new one. As for the policy P21, in equilibrium a politician always chooses the same
(pure) strategy, so the only equilibrium possibilities are: PPP, FPP, and FPU of
the new politician.
If the old politician will not be among the candidates for the second-period elections,
the new politician will be reelected if (and only if) the society will receive the signal
sV
2 = P22 (which occurs with probability 1
2)( s e ePROP. A.1.1.). On the other hand,
if the old politician will run for reelection, the society reelects him if (and only if)
the new politician chose P21 = P11. The probability that the old politician is high
quality conditional on P21 = P11 having been implemented by the new politician is
always strictly greater than p (thanks to the fact that only a nonstrategic politician
who observed θ1 = P11 chooses P21 = P11, which increases the probability attached
by the society to the fact that the old politician implemented the correct policy
in the ﬁrst period, i.e., P11 = θ1), and so the society reelects him. By contrast,
the probability that the old politician is high quality conditional on P21 6= P11
having been implemented is always strictly smaller than p (thanks to the fact that
only a nonstrategic politician who observed θ1 6= P11 chooses P21 6= P11,w h i c h
increases the probability attached by the society to the fact that the old politician
implemented the wrong policy in the ﬁrst period, i.e., P11 6= θ1), and so the society
does not reelect him.
Thus, in equilibrium, the expected probabilities of being reelected related to P21 6=
P11 and P21 = P11 are given, respectively, by EQU. A.2.1 and EQU. A.2.2.An e w
politician who observed θ1 6= P11 chooses P21 6= P11 (he maximizes both his second-
period payoﬀ and his probability of being reelected (for any q>0, EQU. A.2.1 is
not smaller than EQU. A.2.2)). On the other hand, the expected utility for a
strategic new politician who observed θ1 = P11 from choosing P21 6= P11 is
EUnew










while that from choosing P21 = P11 is
EUnew
θ1=P11(P21 = P11)=( G + R)+G + β
∙





The new politician who observed θ1 = P11 chooses P21 6= P11 (i.e., equilibrium
displays FPU of the new politician) if (and only if) EUnew
θ1=P11(P21 = P11) <
EUnew





which calls for β(R+2G) > 2G. Otherwise, he chooses P21 = P11 (i.e., equilibrium
displays PPP of the new politician).
26A.4. Model with inﬁnitely repeated elections
Proposition A.4.1. If q =0and G =0 , there exists a Markov perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the overlapping generation model (with a term limit of 3 periods)
where:
(i) the society never reelects an incumbent politician who has spent only one period
in oﬃce;
(ii) an incumbent politician always maximizes social welfare during his ﬁrst period
in oﬃce;
(iii) the society reelects an incumbent politician who has already spent two periods
in oﬃce if (and only if) he conﬁrms his ﬁrst-period decision;
(iv) an incumbent politician always conﬁrms his ﬁrst-period decision during his
second period in oﬃce.
P R O O FO FP R O P .A.4.1. An incumbent politician always maximizes social
welfare during his ﬁr s tp e r i o di no ﬃce (point (ii)) because he never will be reelected
(point (i)). Given this strategy, as γ → 0 his reputation evaluated at the end of
that period will converge to the ap r i o r iprobability p. The per-period expected
utility from reelecting the incumbent politician is
EUS









· 0)] + β
∙














while that from electing a new politician is
EUS











EQU. A.4.1 can be rewritten as
EUS















it follows that EUS
I <E U S
new, and so the society does not reelect the incumbent
politician.
The society reelects a politician who has already spent two periods in oﬃce if
(and only if) he conﬁrmed his ﬁrst-period decision (point (i)). Since G =0 ,t h e
incumbent politician always implements the ﬁrst-period policy during his second
period in oﬃce (point (ii)).
We now show that it is actually optimal for the society to reelect a politician who
27h a sa l r e a d ys p e n tt w op e r i o d si no ﬃce if (and only if) he conﬁrmed his ﬁrst-period
decision. Let z ∈ {P21 = P11,P 21 6= P11} and μ(z) be the incumbent politician’s
reputation after choosing z. The per-period expected utility from reelecting the
incumbent politician who has already spent two periods in oﬃce is
EUS





EQU. A.4.2 is greater (smaller) than EQU. A.4.1 if μ(z) is greater (smaller) than
p.W h e nε>0,t h e n
μ(P21 = P11) >pand μ(P21 6= P11) <p
Thus if P21 = P11 (P21 6= P11), then EUS
II(z) > (<)EUS
new, and so it is optimal
for the society reelects (does not reelect) the incumbent politician who has already
spent two periods in oﬃce.
Proposition A.4.2. If q =1 , G =0 ,a n dp>1
2, there exists a Markov perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the game with inﬁnitely repeated elections and no term limit
where:
(i) the society reelects an incumbent politician in period t who has spent in oﬃce
the previous period t − 1 if (and only if) he chose Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1;
(ii) an incumbent politician in period t who has spent the previous period t − 1 in
oﬃce always chooses Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1;
(iii) the society reelects an incumbent politician in period t who has not spent in
oﬃce the previous period t − 1 if (and only if) he chose Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1;
(iv) an incumbent politician in period t who has not spent the previous period t−1
in oﬃce chooses Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1.
P R O O FO FP R O P .A.4.2. From points (i) and (ii), it follows immediately
that if a politician is voted out of oﬃce, then he will never take oﬃce again in the
future. Since G =0 , politicians chooses the action that maximizes the probability
that he will win the next election. Thus the incumbent politician in period t who
has spent the previous period t − 1 in oﬃce always chooses Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1 (point
ii), while the incumbent politician in period t who has not spent in oﬃce the pre-
vious period t − 1 always chooses Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1 (point iv).
We now show that the society’s strategies described in points (i) and (iii) are
optimal, given the politicians’ equilibrium strategies. Suppose ﬁrstly that the in-
cumbent politician in period t who has spent the previous period t−1 in oﬃce chose
Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1. Given this strategy, as γ → 0 his reputation evaluated at the end
of that period will converge to the ap r i o r iprobability p. If the society reelects the
incumbent politician obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS




τ−t [2p +( 1− p)]


























it follows immediately that EUS
II(Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1) >E U S
new(Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1),a n d
so when Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1, the society reelects the incumbent politician. On the other
hand, suppose that the incumbent politician in period t who has spent the previous
period t − 1 in oﬃce chose Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1. Since only a low-quality nonstrategic
politician who observed sL
tt−1 = θt−1 6= Pt−1t−1 chooses Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1,i ft h e
society reelects the incumbent politician obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS











while if the society elects a new politician, it obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS







τ−t [2p +( 1− p)],
because in the next period t +1the new politician maximizes social welfare (he is
not concerned about improving the rival’s reputation, the society indeed knows he




it follows immediately that EUS
II(Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1) <E U S
new(Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1),
and so when Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1, the society does not reelect the incumbent politician.
We have shown that the society reelects an incumbent politician in period t who
has spent in oﬃce the previous period t−1 if (and only if) he chose Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1
(point i).
Suppose now that an incumbent politician in period t who has not spent the previous
period t − 1 in oﬃce chose Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1. If the society reelects the incumbent
politician obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS













τ−t [2p +( 1− p)]
while if the society elects a new politician or the incumbent politician in period
t − 1, it obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS













τ−t [2p +( 1− p)].
18Note that in the next period t +1 ,w h e np> 1
2, the society never elects the low-quality
politician who was voted out of oﬃce in the previous period t because the per-period payoﬀ
provided by a politician with reputation of p who persists in implementing the previous policy
is greater than the per-period payoﬀ provided by a low-quality politician who maximizes social









it follows immediately that EUS
I (Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1) >E U S
new(Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1),
and so when Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1, the society reelects the incumbent politician. On
the other hand, suppose that an incumbent politician in period t who has not spent
the previous period t − 1 in oﬃce chose Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1. Only a nonstrategic
politician who observed sL
tt−1 = θt−1 = Pt−1t−1 chooses Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1,w h i c h
increases the probability attached by the society to the fact that the old politician




p +( 1− p)1
2
>p .
and, if elected, in the next period t +1the old politician maximizes social welfare.
The reason is that if he will choose Pt+1t = Ptt, the previous politician’s reputation
will also become μold; however, since the society prefers FPP to FPU, then at the
end of period t +1it will reelect the old politician. Hence, if the society elects the
old politician obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS








2μold +( 1− μold)
¤
while if it reelects the incumbent politician, it obtains the continuation payoﬀ
EUS




τ−t [2p +( 1− p)].
From
μold >p
it follows immediately that EUS
old(Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1) >E U S
I (Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1),a n d
so when Ptt−1 = Pt−1t−1, the society does not reelect the incumbent politician. We
have shown that the society reelects an incumbent politician in period t who has
not spent in oﬃce the previous period t−1 if (and only if) he chose Ptt−1 6= Pt−1t−1
(point iii).
30